Reflexiones sobre la libertad : aportes de la filosofía de Merleau Ponty

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to illuminate the problem of freedom, using as a starting point the reflection of Merleau-Ponty, which he develops in his book: Phenomenology of perception. From a philosophical perspective, elaborated on the corporal rooting, this author covers new perspectives that liberate the notion of freedom from the narrowness that is proper of modernity, in which the idea of freedom ends in the idea of putting the other as a limit, and as an obstacle for our own freedom. In doing so, he introduces an anthropological re-elaboration from which he shows the richness of the subject of action, richness who extremely attenuated by the cartesian notion of res cogitans, against which Merleau-Ponty argues continuously. To explain his notion of freedom, we start by briefly presenting the problem of modern notion of freedom −freedom as autonomy– and the characteristics of the subject under this notion. Secondly, we will present the problem of freedom and its circumstances as it is formulated both in the liberal position and in Merleau-Ponty´s view. Based on these reflections, we will show how this author understands the subject of action and the reason why this implies a re-interpretation of the notion of nature and deliberation. Finally, we will display the notion of freedom of Merleau-Ponty for whom the other is a condition of possibility of his own freedom.